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Energy-efficient lighting in an imperfect market 
1. Introduction 
The role of demand-side management (DSM) in newly created competitive 
electricity markets is not clear. Some have hailed this type of market 
transformation as a new opportunity for DSM. Although the last decade has 
revealed substantial potentials for reducing the use of energy by implementing 
more efficient technology, only a small fraction of this technology has been 
implemented; introducing competition into electricity markets could result in more 
of these savings being captured. Others see the sector's transformation as the 
beginning of the demise of DSM. Certainly, the result of more competition in the 
electricity industry in both Norway and England has been reduced interest and 
activity by the governments and utilities in DSM. And in the Urtited States major 
reductions in DSM programme budgets have been proposed as utilities respond to 
the potential for a competitive market structure (Haaland 1995). \ 
This paper seeks first to detail some of the theoretical and general aspects of the 
electricity industry and DSM, and then to apply these aspects to a real world 
context - e1:1ergy-efficient lighting for low-income households in South Afyica. The 
purpose of the paper is to contribute to the growing discussion concernfug DSM 
and increased competition in the electricity industry in South ~rica. \ 
2. Assumptions and definitions 
While it should be noted that these may not apply to all schools of thought and 
contexts, the following assumptions and definitions have been employed in this 
paper. 
• The electricity industry comprises four sectors: generation, distribution (also 
referred to here as the electricity distribution industry (EDI)), transmission and 
retail. In most instances these sectors have been refered to specifically. 
Otherwise, the term 'electricity industry' has been used to refer to the industry 
as a whole. 
• Generation is defined as the process used to create electricity. Transmission is 
the process of conducting the flow of electricity at high voltages from the points 
of generation to the locations of groups of electricity users, such as residential 
neighbourhoods, industrial parks, or commercial centres. Distribution of 
electricity is the process of transforming high-voltage electricity to lower 
voltages and then physically delivering it to households, industrial facilities, 
commercial establishments, government offices, and other electricity users. 
Retail sale of electricity is the process of marketing electricity to the ultimate 
customers (Brennan et al 1996). ' 
• Some literature, especially that from the US, uses the term deregulation to 
describe the process in which the electricity industry is introduced to (more) 
market competition. This "term is somewhat misleading: it is indicative of a 
relaxation of regulations on the electricity industry. In many countries, 
including South Africa, the process of bringing more competition to the 
electricity industry might, in fact, result in a need for more regulation than is 
required of a less competitive electricity industry. In this paper the term is 
avoided. Instead, more neutral phrases such as 'reform in' or 'restructuring of' 
the electricity industry are used. 
• Where the electricity industry is not competitive, the term utility is used to refer 
to the institution undertaking generation, distribution and transmission 
activities. Where competition has been introduced within the industry, the term 
'utility' is again used in its generic form - though here referring to a specific 
sector of the electricity industry. 
• Economic efficiency, or Pareto Optimality, refers to a state in which no entity 
can be made better off without making another entity worse off. In general, 
energy efficiency refers to a state in which less energy is used to produce the 
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same amount of services or useful output. Essential to this paper, economic 
efficiency does not necessarily imply energy efficiency; neither does energy 
efficiency imply economic efficiency. 
• Although, in theory, demand-side management (DSM) activities can refer to 
any measure taken by an individual, household, or firm to change the end-use 
of energy towards a specific objective, DSM in this paper refers, unless 
otherwise stated, to activities initiated by utilities. Such activities are designed 
to influence customer use of electricity in ways that will produce desired 
changes in a utility's load shape (that is, changes in the time pattern and 
magnitude of a utility's load). Utility programmes falling under this umbrella of 
DSM include: load management, new uses of electricity, energy conservation, 
electrification, customer generation adjustments in market share and innovative 
rates (Pye 1994). 
• More competition in the electricity industry is meaningful, as long as the 
barriers to entry into the market are not too significant. This is to say, a leaning 
towards market forces (more competition) is regarded in this paper as a social 
good in that it is likely that it will lead to improved economic efficiency. 
• DSM is a social good; that is, society benefits from more DSM activity. This 
assumption is based on: 
• the numerous environmental benefits associated with utilising less resources 
to generate (at least) an equivalent amount of energy output; 
• the savings utilities implicitly derive in avoiding significant capital outlays 
required to build new power plants; 
• the savings on utility bills to users utilising less energy for the same service. 
3. The trend towards reform in the electricity industry 
Historically, large natural monopolies have dominated electricity industries 
around the world. Until relatively recently these monopolies were justified within 
the context of an understanding that the generation, transmission and distribution 
of electricity is best undertaken on a large-scale. Accordingly, it was thought that 
the nature of the electricity industry is such that over a range of output - for any or 
all of the aforementioned activities - long-run average costs fall. In other words, by 
expanding activity, costs per unit of output decline. Due to the scale and scope of 
investment, particularly to . enter the industry, and operations required, public 
sector support (even ownership) has often been relied upon. By definition, 
competition in such economies is precluded: a single firm can supply the entire 
service at lower cost than could two or more firms, and, given its cost structure, an 
established utility can undercut its rivals and drive them from the market 
(Moorhouse 1996). Secure from competition, natural monopolies could exploit the 
consumer we_re it not for regulation or state ownership. 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a shift in the nature of this thinking and 
practice. In fact, consensus has now been reached that the natural monopoly 
structure is not necessarily the most appropriate stnicfure for all sectors of the 
electricity industry. Certainly, in the generation sector, a growing body of empirical 
evidence, primarily from the United States, shows that smaller generation units are 
more economically efficient than one-firm structures. High-efficiency gas turbines 
and combined cycle turbines tend, for instance, to have lower capital and operating 
costs per megawatt-hour of electricity produced than new coal-fired generators, 
and they also have comparable reliability in generating performance (Brennan et al 
1996). Moreover, the former are generally quicker and easier to bring into 
operation. At the other end of the scale, electricity transmission involves substantial 
fixed costs (for instance, transmission lines and right-of-way agreements), and 
therefore continues to be a natural monopoly. It is less clear what organisational 
form is best suited to distribution and retail sale. Traditionally, these services have 
been provided as joint products. On the one hand, this arrangement could continue 
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to make sense if it is cheaper for one entity to be both the electricity distributor and 
the seller (that is, there are economies of scope). On the other hand, the retail sale of 
electricity does not require large fixed costs for capital equipment that the physical 
distribution of electricity involves, and may therefore be amenable to competition 
(Brennan et al 1996). 
Current thinking is that even if economies of scale and scope do exist, they are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural monopoly to exist. In this regard, 
technical and economic efficiency, though seen a's vital drivers of the design and 
development of electricity facilities, are now not viewed as the only deciding 
factors: reliability also plays a major role in such processes. As Berlin, Cicchetti and 
Gillen (1974) note, '[t]he contingency to be guarded against is that a particular unit 
·will not be available when needed. If generating capacity consists of a large 
number of small units, risk is spread over each of the units.' It has also become 
clearer that the efficient use of resources to produce and distribute electricity 
requires information about relative valuations that can only be generated by 
voluntary market exchange (Moorhouse 1996). 
Few governments argue today that electricity industries are most effective or 
efficient as vertically integrated natural monopolies requiring government support. 
Several nations, including the United Kingdom, Norway, New Zealand, Chile and 
Argentina, have already restructured their electric utility systems. Similar 
initiatives are being implemented or considered in other parts of the world 
including Sweden and some parts of the United States (Haaland 1995). 
There are several degrees to which an electricity industry can be introduced to 
competition. In general, competition in wholesaling is sought before competition in 
retailing. In fact, competition in retail is meaningless if the wholesale industry is 
not liberalised. Wholesale competition essentially entails separating the 
transmission, generation and distribution sectors, in an effort to open up the 
market so that all generators can sell power to local distributor utilities and other 
wholesale customers, such as power marketers. Under this scenario, electricity 
users would continue to purchase electricity from local utilities. Retail competition 
entails the separation of local distribution from retail sales. Users - including 
residential customers - would purchase electricity from the generator or marketer 
of their choice. There would be a number of electricity retailers to chose from, each 
potentially offering different packages of services and prices. Generating 
companies would resemble those under wholesale competition, except that they 
would be in a position to sell power to electricity retailers or directly to customers, 
instead of just to local distributors with a monopoly franchise for selling power 
(Brennan et al 1996). 
To date, the electricity industry in South Africa has been dominated by Eskom, a 
vertically integrated and state-owned utility, and in most respects a good example 
of the type of traditional monopoly referred to above. Over the last four years, the 
industry has been carefully scrutinised with a view to it potentially being reformed. 
While many issues have been raised and demands specified, universal agreement 
on how to proceed has not been attained. Consensus has, however, been reached 
that (i) competition in the wholesale market will precede competition in retail, and 
(ii) the EDI will be targeted for reform first. 
The EDI is highly fragmented - over 400 separate distributors are currently 
responsible for distributing electricity to customers around the country - with 
Eskom being by far the largest player in terms of energy sales for final 
consumption and number of customers. Moreover, roughly one third of the 
municipalities acting as electricity distributors currently cannot consistently 
provide adequate, reliable, and acceptable quality service (Galen 1997). It is 
expected that restruchrring in the EDI will entail activity that primarily seeks to 
rationalise these distributors, or in other words to consolidate the EDI. Early on in 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
3 
Energy-efficient lighting in an imperfect market 
the debate, the Electricity Working Group (EWG)1 recommended that the 
fragmented EDI be consolidated into one single national electricity distributor. 
Later, this recommendation was withdrawn and replaced by one that suggested 
the EDI be consolidated into between five and 17 regional electricity distributors 
(REDs), to be formed by merging the electricity distribution functions of Eskom 
and local authorities in specific areas.2 It was suggested that, if managed correctly, 
these REDs will be placed in a strong position to apply more effective credit control 
measures as well as boost the government's electrification programme (Business 
Day 7 /3/97). More recently there have been calls for extending the number of 
REDs even more (Business Day8/7 /97). 
While the reason for the EWG backtracking on its initial recommendation is 
unclear, it is interesting, and informative to this paper and to the wider debate that 
the recommendation was altered. At first glance, rationalising the EDI from more 
than 400 local distributors to about five is not indicative of a move towards a 
greater reliance on market forces and competition. Placing restrictions on the 
number and nature of the players in the ·EDI certainly limits the stage for 
competition and competitive behaviour. It could be otherwise argued. Though 400 
and more institutions are currently taking the responsibility for distributing 
electricity, the EDI is not operating within a competitive environment.· This is 
because Eskom is dominating the EDI, a third of the others are financially unviable, 
and Eskom has a monopoly on electricity generation. In essence the conditions for 
competition in the industry are not presenr· with the EDI in its current form. 
Consolidating the EDI such that distributors (though limited) are able to compete 
on a more equal basis (in terms of financial, size and capacity), is surely indicative 
of a move towards creating the conditions for broad-based competition within the 
entire industry at later stages of reform - that is, moving from wholesale to retail 
competition in the longer term. This argument makes some sense in the light of the 
overall nature of the electricity industry: that sectors of the electricity industry are 
integrally linked, and more specific to this argument, that change in one sector 
might only have full impact once other sectors have also been reformed. In essence 
it can be said that the creation of the.REDs lays the ground for future broad-based 
competition in the entire industry. That there will always be some market power in 
distribution has not gone undisputed though: it is envisaged that the functions of 
the National Electricity Regulator (NER) will attempt to protect electricity users 
from potential collusive or other monopoly-related activity. 
Following international trends, recognition of the need to introduce competition 
into the South African electricity distribution is also beginning to emerge. How or 
when this will be done is currently undecided. Recent actions and stipulations of 
the NER clearly lean towards preparing the electricity industry for more 
competition in generation. The NER now requires, for instance, that Eskom 
ringfence its accounts for each of its generation units, and is attempting to create 
conditions such that the next major investment in power production is not an 
Eskom-driven initiative. Furthermore, there has been some debate on the potential 
role that independent power producers (IPPs) might begin to play. 3 
As elsewhere, the short-term potential for introducing competition into high-
voltage transmission is limited in South Africa. It continues to make economic and 
organisational sense for this service to be operated and managed by one firm: 
indeed, substantial economies of scale and scope can be attained from operating in 
this way. 
Currently retail sale of electricity falls within the activities of the EDI. It is likely 
that retail and distribution will now be separated, but not within the next five 
The EWG was the result of one of the National Electricity Regulator's first at overseeing 
and licensing electricity distribution authorities (Galen 1997). 
In doing so, Eskom's distribution functions will be separated from generation. 
IPPs are non-utility generators able to compete in selling generation capacity. 
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years. Through reform in other sectors of the industry, conditions for this to occur 
will gradually be created. 
4. Theoretical aspects of DSM in more competitive markets 
4.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous section, competition will be introduced into the 
generation and retail sale of electricity in South Africa, and this will be facilitated 
by a consolidation of the distribution industry. This section looks at the theoretical 
aspects of competition that underpin this process. 
4.2 Restructuring and market forces 
In a fully competitive electricity industry (that is, one in which competition has 
extended to retail sale of electricity), any electricity consumer (residential, 
commercial or industrial) would be able to purchase kilowatt-hours from any 
supplier, but still through regulated distribution utilities. This situation would 
invite an era of fierce price competition (Mills 1993). An example of the type of 
activity that could result from this form of deregulation is retail wheelingwhereby 
customers can shop around for the least-cost electricity supply and have it. 
'wheeled' across existing local electric utility lines. The custon;i.er pays the local· 
utility a retail wheeling rate for transmission and distribution seryices and buys 
electricity generation services (capacity and energy) from a different supplier. The 
supplier could be a neighbouring electricity generator, a non-utility generator, an 
electricity broker or a customer's own co-generation facility· located at a different 
site (Pye 1994). 
In many countries it is neither possible nor feasible in the short-to-medium term to 
introduce full-fledged competition into the electricity industries, and thus more 
moderate means of liberalising them might be favoured. In South Africa, for 
instance, the conditions for competition of the nature described above do not exist. 
There is currently no competition, for example, in fhe generation of electricity. 
Conditions for competition need to be created. Nevertheless, the trend in South 
Africa as elsewhere is towards a greater reliance on customer choice and market 
forces, and away from monopoly control. This approach is based on a classical or 
neo-classical theory of markets. 
4.3 Neo-classical economics and perfect competition 
The central tenant of classical and neo-classical theory is the proposition that agents 
operate in an environment of perfect competition, in which markets costlessly 
adjust to maintain the supply and demand for every good and service in constant 
equilibrium. The early theorists placed full confidence in the 'invisible hand' of the 
market to bring about a competitive equilibrium.4 In the light of emerging levels of 
unemployment and inflation in the late 1960s - clear indications of market 
disequilibrium - Keynesians rejected the early claims of the classical economists. 
The proclaimed instead that, as the automatic adjustment mechanism of 
competition cannot be relied upon to achieve full employment and price stability, 
public sector intervention is necessary if such disequilibria were to be avoided. 
Market-based theories emerged again, as evidence mounted that government 
intervention is not the panacea either. The neo-classical competitive model differs 
from classical theorists' traditional treatments of perfectly competitive economics 
inasmuch as agents in it do not have full information about the structure of 
economy in which they operate. Instead, they make decisions based on their 
rational expectation of what will happen. Mistakes are made only to the extent that 
the economy is subjected to random and exogenous shocks, either in the form of 
policy surprises or fluctuations in technology (Laidler 1986; Fischer 1987; Hoover 
1988). Today, most economists are in agreement that 'market failure', or 'barriers' 
A competitive equilibrium results when demand equals supply. 
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to entry into the market do exist. They disagree, however, as to how effective 
government is at dealing with this. 
Economists define market 'failure', as the inability of a system of private markets to 
provide certain goods either at all or at the most optimal level (Pearce 1992). In 
other words, market failure does not mean that nothing good has happened, but 
that the best attainable outcome has not been achieved (Lipsey et al 1993). Market 
'barriers'are factors that inhibitmarket agents from purchasing goods and services 
where benefits exceed costs. 
4.4 Market failures and barriers 
There is no single market for energy services: instead there are many energy 
services and many different markets for them. Furthermore, there are many cross-
cutting distinctions within each of these markets. It helps, when defining and 
discussing market failures and barriers, to be more specific about the kind of 
service. Noting the large number of market barriers that can occur in energy 
markets, this narrowing-down process is particularly important. Energy efficiency, 
the focus of this discussion, is an example of a cross-cutting distinction in the 
markets for energy services. It is not a 'stand-alone product' but one that has 
implication for energy demand at the one extreme and energy supply at the other 
(Golove & Eto 1996). Thus, the following examples and explanations of market 
failures and market barriers refer specifically to energy efficiency related concerns. 
Sutherland (1991) suggests that market failures in energy markets are due to 
several factors: 
• Environmental extemalities 
The term extemality refers to a situation where the activity of one economic agent 
causes a change in the utility of another agent, and this change is not compensated 
or appropriated (van Horen 1996). Externalities can be positive or negative, 
although attention is usually given to the latter. In energy markets, externalities 
normally relate to the costs associated with usage of, or damage done to, 
environmental resources which are then not included in costs of production. 
• Energy conservation research as a public good 
The total cost of undertaking energy conservation research does not increase as the 
number of users of the research increases. Because agents potentially interested in 
the research know that it will be undertaken anyway, they do not see a need for, or 
economic benefit in, providing this service of their own accord. 
• National security aspectS of energy supply 
All agents in a given environment know that the public sector will ensure that 
energy supply remains secure, and again see no reason to provide it of their own 
accord. 
Market barriers, or imperfections in the market that prevent investment in energy 
efficiency include the following: 
• Imperfect information 
Customers may not have access to reliable information concerning their energy use 
and the costs and benefits of DSM technologies (Levine et al 1994; Golove & Eto 
1996; Haaland 1995). Alternatively, customers may not be directly responsible for 
their energy-use behaviour if another party bears responsibility for paying their 
energy bills (Levine et al 1994). Golove and Eto (1996) describe this as being a 
problem of 'misplaced or split incentives'. 
• Imperfect decision-ma.king 
Customers may lack the expertise necessary to solve complex resource and utility 
optimization problems such as life-cycle costs and benefits of energy-using 
technologies and energy-efficiency options. Rather, customers may rely on 
'bounded rationality' that yields generally imperfect results (Simon 1987; Levine et 
al 1994; Haaland 1995). 
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• Capital market accessibility and imperfections 
Some customers may have limited access to capital, and are frequently unable to 
borrow from capital markets (due to any number of constraints, such as income, 
equity, or risk). This then prevents then from making investments in energy-
efficient equipment even though they are aware that this equipment could be 
beneficial to them (Levine et al 1994; Haaland 1995; Golove & Eto). 
Customers may also use discount rates to guide their purchase decisions that are 
much higher than a utility's cost of capital. This can result in under-investment in 
DSM and over-investment in new utility generation (Levine et al 1994). 
• Transaction or hidden costs 
Consumers may find that the costs of gathering and processing information, 
making decisions, and designing and enforcing contracts may be too high to invest 
in energy efficiency (Golove & Eto). 
• Market structure 
The market structure barrier refers to product supply decisions made by 
manufacturers of energy-efficient devices. Certain firms might be able to inhibit 
their competitors from introducing energy-efficient and cost-effective products on 
to the market (Golove & Eto 1996; Haddad 1994). 
• Pricing 
Electricity is often subsdised to levels below the average cost of supply, and 
virtually always below the long-run marginal cost (LRMC). While these are 
justified in terms of reducing the cost of electricity to, for example, low-income 
users, the effect can be counterproductive. At low energy prices, the energy user 
invests too little in energy efficiency and electric utilities have to invest far more, 
increasing society's overall costs for providing electricity (Dutt & Mills 1994). 
• Gold plating 
'Gold plating' refers to the notion that energy efficiency frequently entails the 
purchase of other costly features and is not available separately. Thus, consumers 
are required to make an investment in compact fluorescent lamps in order to 
partake in energy-efficient lighting practices (Golove & Eto 1996; Pye 1994). 5 
Market 'failures' and market 'barriers' prevent users from purchasing 
economically efficient levels of DSM. It seems logical, then, to ask whether some 
form of DSM intervention into this particular market is appropriate. The section to 
follow explains why this would indeed be appropriate. 
4.5 Energy efficiency in economically efficient markets 
A utility must operate economically efficiently to remain competitive in this sector. 
It may engage in DSM or not, depending on the economics. Economic efficiency 
does not imply that energy efficiency will or will not be adopted. On the face of it, 
DSM related activities are expensive for distributors and retailers. For one thing, 
programme costs must be recovered.6 In addition, and in line with the nature of 
DSM, there is a tendency for DSM to adopt true social costs of generation (as 
opposed to private costs). Again, these costs must be recovered. This usually 
implies the need for a tariff increase. If, in this perhaps oversimplistic scenario, all 
distributors and retailers in a market-driven electricity industry engage in DSM 
activities and, if necessary, increase tariffs concurrently, DSM will be justified. 
If distributors and retailers deem DSM cost-ineffective, the spin-off effects for 
electricity industries could be far-reaching. Reduced spending on DSM 
undoubtedly impacts upon utility-funded research and development initiatives. In 
addition to this, a trend to treat data on customer energy patterns and conservation 
programmes as confidential or proprietary information is likely to develop. Mills 
6 
A compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) is the energy saving device most often disseminated 
by utilities and their energy efficiency programmes. For more details see Clark (1997). 
In some countries, regulators allow utilities to recover programme costs in tariff 
structures. 
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(1995), for instance, warns of 'serious departure from the relatively open and 
sharing environment of recent years', where it is 'extremely difficult to conduct 
independent evaluations of DSM programmes' and spread best practice 
information to the market. 
Thus, if retailers and distributors choose not to engage in DSM activities, and the 
resultant impacts are as above, it might be that a national regulator would find it 
within society's interests to require them to undertake a certain amount of DSM (or 
DSM-related activity such as research and development). This could be achieved 
by, for example, (i) a condition of the license agreements distributed by regulators 
to utilities, or (ii) a financial (or other) incentive provided by the regulator or 
generator to distributors and retailers. 
As competition is introduced, utilities might, on the other hand, independently 
chose to engage in, or re-evaluate the approach afforded to, DSM. Utilities might 
find it cost-effective to market DSM as an integral part of a unique service to 
customers, as opposed to merely selling the product. In this regard, Mills (1995) 
suggests that energy efficiency could be promoted as a value-added service. 
Indeed, he argues, 'there is good reason to believe that some customers would 
rather pay a little more for the electricity from a utility offering such a service as 
opposed to getting cheaper electricity from a competitor that does not offer any 
energy efficiency support'. Examples of utility DSM services, which could include 
financial services with the potential to provide much higher leverage than ordinary 
rebates, as well as various forms of technical assistance, are as follows: 
• Financial services 
i. provision of financing for efficient technologies 
ii. leasing of efficient equipment 
iii. acquisition of efficiency-focused technology 
iv. direct sales of energy services (for example, illumination, comfort) 
• Technical services 
i. energy audits 
ii. operation, maintenance, and commissioning 
iii. design and project management 
iv. training of facility operators 
/ 
v. emphasis on non-energy benefits (i.e. socio-economic and environmental 
benefits). 
How, in tum, these services are managed will in tum have impact on the economic 
viability of the utility. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The preceding section serves as an introduction to the section to follow. It has been 
noted that in a market environment DSM activities are costly and usually entail 
more risk. Given market failure and very apparent market entry barriers, it is 
highly unlikely that electricity users would invest in such activities of their own 
accord. Some form of public and/ or utility intervention to reduce barriers is an 
essential prerequisite for customer participation. On the face of it, it does not make 
sense either for utilities to initiate or continue DSM activity, for generally such 
activity is also both costly and risky. Utility DSM activity in competitive markets is 
only worthwhile if it is viewed as a cost-effective business opportunity. This could 
possibly be achieved by utilities offering to provide a series of unique or 
customised DSM-related financial and technical services to potential customers. 
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5. Energy efficiency in South Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section of the paper is to contribute to the debate regarding the 
current role of DSM, and prospects for it in restructured electricity markets in 
South Africa. The discussion looks at DSM and energy efficiency broadly, and then 
. focuses on one specific aspect of DSM: energy-efficient lighting for low-income 
households. The rationale for using this example is that (i) efficient lighting offers 
significant opportunity to utilities to alter their demand profiles, and; (ii) the 
barriers faced by the low-income sector are perhaps most pronounced and thus 
useful for illustrative purposes. 
It is not the intention of this paper to suggest types of cost-effective and 
competitive DSM interventions for Eskom in its present form, and for the electricity 
industry during the various stages of its liberalisation: it is too soon to do the latter 
anyway. Instead, it seems worthwhile to take a step back and to consider some of 
the driving forces behind DSM in less and more competitive electricity industries. 
The remainder of this paper identifies some of the barriers to entry in the energy-
efficient lighting market for low-income households, and how Eskom, in the light 
of its current priorities is planning to assist the low-income sector in overcoming 
some of these barriers. Barriers facing Eskom are then outlined, followed by a 
commentary on DSM initiatives in more competitive markets is given, and overall 
conclusions. 
5.2 Low-income households and energy-efficient lighting 
5.2.1 SoCio-economic indicators 
Tables 1, 2, and'3 below give a broad indication of the average monthly income and 
expenditure (nominal) of selected poor7 households in Johannesburg, Port 
Elizabeth, Durban and Cape Town. Rural income and expenditures are likely to be 
even lower than these figures presented for urban areas. 
Johannesburg Port Elizabeth Durban Cape Town 
Av. Income (R) 945 828 1 119 1 277 
Av. Exoenditure (R) 706 553 1072 ? 
Table 1: Average household income and expenditure: all surveyed households 
(low-income or poor) 
Source: Hoets & Golding (1992); Rossouw & van Wyk (1993); 
Mazur & Qangule (1995) as cited in Simmonds & Mammon (1996) · 
Johannesburg Port Elizabeth Durban Cape Town 
Av. Income (R) 1 458 996 1 342 1 550 
Av. Expenditure (R) 981 672 1 263 ? 
Table 2: Average household income and expenditure: formal surveyed housing 
Source: Hoets & Golding (1992); Rossouw & van Wyk (1993); 
Mazur & Qangule (1995) as cited in Simmonds & Mammon (1996) 
'Poor' is defined as the poorest 40 per cent of households; and 'ultra-poor' as the 
poorest 20 per cent of households. 'Fifty-three percent of South Africa's population 
lives in the poorest 40 per cent of households and are thus classified as poor. Twenty-
nine per cent of the population live in the poorest 20 per cent of households and are 
therefore classified as ultra-poor' (SALDRU 1995). 
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Johannesburg Port Elizabeth Durban Cape Town 
Pl UI Pl U/ BIY I I 
Av. Income (R} 829 782 688 570 595 914 914 
Av. Expenditure (R) 646 616 463 356 345 896 ? 
Note: P: planned; U: unplanned; I: informal housing; B/Y: backyard shacks 
Table ·3: Average household income and expenditure in selected areas 
Source: Hoets & Golding (1992); Rossouw & van Wyk (1993); 




· Living conditions and access to services varies tremendously between the poor and 
the rest of the population. Table 4 details these disparities between different 
consumption groups in terms of their access to electricity. As is shown, the vast 
majority of the poor do not have access to electricity. 
Households ranked by consumption groups of 20% (quintiles) 
% with elec. 
All Quintile Quintile Poorest Quintile Quintile 
SA 1 2 40% 3 4 
(poor) 
53,4 15, 1 27,7 21,4 49,4 77,3 
Table 4: Access to electricity by consumption group 





Finally, an indication of urban electrification by housing type is presented in Table 
5. Formal housing is well electrified whereas informal and backyard shacks are not. 
Housing type Houses Electrified Not electrified % electrified 
Formal 3 500 000 2 700 000 800 000 77 
Informal 724 000 224 000 490 000 31 
Backyard shack 147 000 36 000 111 000 25 
Total 4 361 000 2 960 000 1 401 000 68 
Note: figures are rounded to nearest 1 000 
Table 5: Access to electricity by dwelling type in the urban areas of South Africa 
Source: Davis (1995) 
5.2.2 Barriers to entry for low income households 
The types of barriers faced particularly by low-income households, as opposed to 
other income sectors, into the energy-efficient lighting market illustrate why the 
potential energy savings have not yet been captured. Some of the main barriers 
include the following: 
• Access to electricity 
Electricity provides a superior source of lighting, and is among the cheapest 
options for the provision of this service. Tables 4 and 5 show, however, that the 
vast majority of poor households in South Africa do not have access to this service. 
This immediately precludes these households from entering into the energy-
efficient lighting market. 
• Cost of energy-efficient lighting and access to capital 
In situations where no DSM utility activity is available, access to capital to 
purchase energy-efficient lighting is perhaps the severest market barrier faced by 
low income households. Even though households can expect a financial saving 
over time from an investment in energy-efficient lighting, current consumption 
generally takes precedence over future savings or consumption. This is the same as 
saying that low-income households have a high discount rate for future savings 
and investment in energy-efficient lighting. 
The average cost of a CFL in South Africa is approximately RSO. There are no local 
manufacturers and all units must be imported. Monthly income and expenditures 
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(shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3) suggest that this additional expense is unaffordable to 
many households if lump sum payments are required, and still hard to afford if 
payment by installment are acceptable. In addition to investing in CFLs, 
households might find it necessary to invest in some form of lurrJnaire (a lamp 
shade, or covering) and other equipment - for example, households with only one 
lamp each might need extension cords. These additional expenditures make entry 
even more difficult. 
If opportunities for capital market borrowing do exist, low-income households are 
frequently unaware of it. Although word-of-mouth is usually the main mechanism 
for low-income households gaining access to this type of information, it is highly 
susceptible to distortion and break down. 
• Price of electricity 
Generally, the low consumer cost of subsidised electricity in South Africa makes 
energy-efficient activities less cost-effective. Since the startup costs of utilising 
electricity for lighting efficiently (that is, the price of a CFL and associated 
equipment) are significant, it generally does not make sense for poor households to 
make this type of. investment: households' payback time increases as the cost of 
electricity falls. With the electricity industry restructuring pending, and pledges to 
drop prices even further, this constraint will become increasingly evident. 
• Information and support 
As noted above, households' access to credit might be impeded by informational 
constraints. This problem extends to information detailing technical, economic, 
social and other aspects of CFLs. Without utility intervention, low-income 
households are unlikely to come across satisfactory amounts of information about 
CFLs and support for their usage. This is because CFLs' share in the lighting 
market in South Africa is still very small, largely because there are presently no 
local manufacturers of CFLs. 
5.3 Utilities and energy-efficient lighting 
5.3.1 Eskom's energy-efficient lighting programme 
The National Electricity Regulator (NER) has committed the EDI to targeting 
450 000 new connections annually. In doing so, it aims to raise the percentage of 
electrified households in South Africa from 35 per cent in 1992 to 70 per cent by 
2000 (NER 1995). Eskom currently has sufficient capacity until 2007, given this 
committed construction plan (IEP5). Energy efficiency is thus not an immediate 
priority from an Eskom generation-capacity perspective (Eskom 1996a). 8 A study 
of 32 potential energy-efficiency programmes suggests, however, that a reduction 
in peak load of 2 500 MW is achievable by 2015 at a life cycle cost which is 
considerably lower than that of an equivalent power station. Furthermore, 
customers participating in the programme could realise an RS billion benefit 
through reduced electricity costs. At least 80 per cent of the cost of the energy 
efficiency programme (R3.5 million) would be recoverable from participating 
customers (Eskom 1996b). In this regard, it has made sense for Eskom to phase in 
the programme slowly. 
Eskom's immediate focus is on the residential sector. In fact, energy-efficiency 
programmes in this sector are the first energy efficiency programmes to be 
designed and implemented by Eskom. In essence, the residential sector has been 
targeted because of the nature of its consumption: residential load (demand) 
constitutes 75 percent of the total national variable load (demand) and is on the 
increase due to the impact of electrification (Eskom 1997a). Efficiency 
improvements in this sector could clearly contribute to a reduction in peak 
demand. These residential efficiency programmes are now housed in the 
Eskom defines energy efficiency as 'the effective conversion and utilisation of energy in 
meeting customers' energy service needs in a manner which results in reduced life 
cycle costs for both Eskom and its customers' (Eskom 1996a). 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
11 
Energy-efficient lighting in an imperfect market 
Residential Demand Side Management (RDSM) Programme and include water-
heating load control, time-of-use tariffs, thermal efficiency, appliance labelling, 
energy-efficient behaviour, limited supply capacity tariff options (for 
electrification) and energy-efficient lighting. 
The main objective of the energy-efficient lighting (EEL) programme is to introduce 
cost-effective energy-efficient lighting schemes into all residential sectors, to reduce 
the evening peak by at least 770 MW by the year 2015, dependent on the 
developing balance between system supply and demand. The reason that the 
residential sector has been targeted is that it is largely responsible for the peaky 
nature of the national load profile. Other objectives of EEL include the following: 
• making CFLs widely available at affordable prices; 
• improving customer service by reducing lighting cost in the household; 
• contributing to environmental conservation; and 
• supporting the macro-economic development of the country (Eskom 1996b). 
The programme allows for a range of specific DSM activities to be initiated in the 
low-, middle-, and upper-income sectors. In each of these sectors, the programme 
will consider the initial price per lamp that customers pay, awareness of CFLs and 
customer benefits, customer acceptance of CFLs, and CFL availability. 
Eskom expects that EEL can achieve the following MW peak demand reductions in 
all three market segmentations, and reports impressive potential savings (net 
present values) to both its participants and to the utility. 
Sector MW-2000 MW- 2015 
High~income 90 500 
Middle-income 30 90 
Low-income 20 90 
TOTAL 140 680 
Table 6: Projected peak demand reductions 
Source: Eskom 1996b 
Household Utility 
Sector Net financial benefits Net cost savings 
(R millions) (R millions) 
High income 556.17 913.76 
Middle income 51.86 72.94 
Low income 58.51 94.77 
Table 7: Projected utility and households savings 
Source: Eskom 1996b. 
EEL is in its developmental phase, and thus it is too early to describe its activities in 
detail. Personal communication with programme staff and draft project 
documentation reveals, though, that Eskom is considering the following for the 
low-income sector: 
• launching the programme as a continuing initiative - that is, Eskom will 
attempt to promote and sustain the use of CFLs; 
• launching a series of pilot projects to test utility impact and customer 
acceptance; 
• launching an energy-efficient lighting programme; 
• targeting newly electrified and previously electrified low-income 
households; 
• targeting all lights in low-income sectors, since the houses are generally 
small; 
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• using the same technology in the low-income sector as for middle- and high-
income sectors; 
• liaising with local councils and social organisations in low-income areas 
when distributing the lighting devices; 
• issuing CFLs free of charge in some areas, offering others at reduced prices 
in other areas; 
• requesting payment be made through the tariff in some areas, requesting 
payment by installment in other areas. 
5.3.2 Eskom and DSM in the electricity industry today 
Eskom's EEL for the low-income sector is geared towards altering the load profile 
of electricity demanded by this sector. The programme aims to assist the low-
income sector in overcoming some of the barriers to entry into the energy-efficient 
lighting market. Like users of electricity, utilities also face barriers to entry into the 
DSM market. These barriers vary in significance and include the following: 
• Cost of DSM programme 
DSM programmes are generally costly; Eskom estimates, for instance, that its 
energy-efficient lighting programme alone could cost over R4 million per annum 
(Eskom 1996c) and success is not assured. 
• Access to information 
For the energy-efficient lighting programme to take effect, further research is 
needed. Currently, relatively little is known about energy for lighting usage 
patterns in low-income households (for example, the number of lamps used in 
individual low-income households or the number of hours that these lamps are 
used for each day). This type of information is essential for the programme to be 
successful. 
• Availability of technology 
CFLs are not readily available in South Africa, and Eskom needs to rely on 
imported CFLs. Currently there is an overall shortage of such lighting devices in 
the international market, and so each time Eskom requires CFLs they must be 
ordered. Lag times between ordering and receiving can be quite significant and 
have the pote'ntial to undermine programme processes. This has not been a 
problem in South Africa yet, but once Eskom's energy-efficient lighting programme 
gains momentum and the pilot projects are implemented, CFL availability could 
pose an obstacle to the programme. 
• Price of CFLs 
Eskom, as noted, depends on imported CFLs. The cost of these devices is 
dependent on the rate of exchange of the Rand. Given the limited means of poor 
households, Eskom will potentially need to bear a proportion of the financial 
burden. In the light of low electricity prices, and Eskom's commitments to lowering 
them even further, this cost might be hard to justify. 
• Uncertainty in electricity industry 
Though it is too soon to say, the pending restructuring of the electricity industry in 
the country could have significant impact on the RDSM programme. If, for instance 
it is decided that RDSM programme costs and lost revenues cannot be recovered 
through tariffs, RDSM activities could potentially be reduced.9 This, in tum, would 
hurt the energy-efficient lighting programme. Concerns such as these hinder the 
natural progression of the programme. 
In Britain, electric utilities have yet to become active in promoting energy efficiency for 
this very reason. 
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• Current excess capacity 
As noted, energy efficiency activities are not yet a priority for Eskom. Until South 
Africa begins to run short of its excess installed capacity, it is unlikely that this will 
change. In this regard, the programme will continue to face internal debate. 
Because these barriers may prevent utilities from engaging in DSM, regulators 
often find it in society's interests to regulate that utilities undertake a certain 
amount of DSM. In South Africa, this has not been the case. Clearly Eskom sees 
enough benefit in DSM that they are willing to tackle such barriers. Indeed, it is in 
Eskom's interests to investigate the consumer market for DSM in South Africa. The' 
reason for this have been explained: Eskom needs to start designing and 
implementing ways of altering the residential electricity demand profile. At current 
rates of consumption, South Africa will soon begin to run short of installed 
capacity, and new investment in additional power plants might be necessary. 
Energy-efficient lighting is one of the areas Eskom has chosen to target in an 
attempt to alter the demand profile. 
The adoption of DSM appears cost-effective to Eskom in its current form. From 
both a financial and an institutional point of view, it is relatively easy for Eskom, as 
a vertically integrated utility, to engage in such activities. Altering the demand 
profile is a task that the generation and distribution components of Eskom would 
oversee. Similarly, investing in new power plants is also the responsibility of 
Eskom generation. Because generation and distribution activities, though separate, 
both currently fall under Eskom, DSM activity is easier to undertake. As will be 
shown next, when competition is introduced, however and if generation and 
distribution are separated, the decision to adopt DSM activities is not clear cut. A 
danger exists that DSM might be in the interests of generation, but not necessarily 
in the interests of distribution or transmission, or vice versa. 
5.3.3 DSM in a more competitive electricity industry10 
The South African electricity industry is waiting for a vision. Other than Cabinet's 
recent commitment to rationalising the EDI, few other definite steps have been 
made towards the restructuring process. As such, uncertainty regarding the future 
form of the industry abounds. The role of DSM in these more competitive markets 
is even less clear. In this light, the commentary below can only be based on what 
might happen. 
Various stages towards introducing more competition into the electricity industry 
in South Africa have been proposed. The first, as noted, is for the EDI to be 
rationalised into approximately five regional electricity distributors (REDs). When 
this happens, and it is expected that it will be relatively soon, th~ EDI will be 
completely separated from generation and transmission. In effect, this means that 
Eskom's market power in distribution will be reduced, while its market power in 
generation will remain roughly the same. 
What are the implications of this for DSM? Rationally, the REDs would strive to sell 
as many units of electricity as possible. As electricity prices must be competitive, 
engaging in DSM activity might not necessarily be economically efficient - unless, 
as was described in section 4.5, REDs combine the electricity product with a service 
too. REDs would purchase electricity from Eskom's generation sector (at this early 
stage in the process still a monopoly), and would pay for its transmission. Given 
that Eskom generation will face similar pressure's on demand during peak hours 
and on installed capacity, it might be in its interests to encourage these distributors 
to support DSM. This could be achieved by Eskom generation offering financial or 
other incentives to REDs to carry out DSM initiatives. Pricing structures .could be 
set such that is would be in the REDs' interests to purchase an increasing amount of 
10 With perhaps the exception of the barrier resulting from uncertainty in the electricity 
industry, the barriers to entry into the energy efficient lighting market as described in 
the previous section still apply. 
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electricity out of peak hours. Eskom generation might also chose to enter into long-
term agreements with customers with a high demand for electricity such that 
electricity is transmitted directly to the user, and where the role of the distributor is 
only nominal. Small, fixed fees {the structures of which could be determined by the 
NER), could be paid to the transmission sector by the customer for usage of the 
transmission wires. Conditions of the contact between Eskom generation and the 
customer might be that the customer engage in energy-saving activity. In fact, it 
might not even be necessary for energy-saving conditions to be attached to such a 
contract: long-term users may engage in energy-efficient measures of their own 
accord if the peak/ off-peak pricing structures signal the benefits of a change in 
energy-use behaviour. 
It is unlikely that Eskom generation will directly drive DSM activities targeted at 
the residential sector. It is more likely that until the way is paved for the 
establishment of a retail industry, residential DSM programmes will be driven by, 
and administered within, the EDI. It is unlikely in the short-to-medium term that 
distributors (and other utilities) will compete with each other to provide either 
products or services to low-income households. Similarly to the way electrification 
initiatives are seen today, it is likely that the offer of DSM support to low-income 
households will be seen more as a social responsibility than a business opportunity 
for the utilities.11 Perhaps it will be in the interests of the individual REDs to offer 
DSM support to the low-income sector now, with a view to preparing to capture a 
future consumer base. Perhaps by providing DSM support to the low-income 
sector, the REDs will be in a position to manage peak demand better, thus 
minimising the purchase of expensive peak-hour electricity from Eskom 
generation. 
The next major phase of the process will probably involve the introduction of 
competition in the generation sector. The NER may foster the creation and 
development of a number of independent power producers (IPPs). For installed , 
capacity and load management reasons, newly created IPPs might again need to 
carefully manage electricity usage during peak hours. Perhaps the NER will further 
simulate competition in energy markets by requiring that all power produced is 
sent to a common national electricity pool. As has been done in other parts of the 
world (the UK especially), the REDs could acquire electricity from this pool by 
bidding on a regular basis for it. The regulator (or generators) might in turn require 
that the REDs include in bids an illustration of their predicted demand profile. It 
could be in the interests of the REDs to adopt some DSM activity in an attempt to 
submit the winning bid. The·.REDs may also chose to engage in DSM irrespective of 
the bidding processes. If a common electricity pool is not established, then 
competition between the various generators to sell electricity to the distributors 
will be more transparent, which will imply less scope for generators to attach 
conditions to the sale of electricity. Distributors will always choose the cheapest 
source of electricity, and therefore there is less scope for DSM initiatives. If DSM is 
deemed socially desirable, a role for the NER might develop here. As described 
above, IPPs could engage in long-term agreements with high-demand electricity 
customers. Incentives could be offered, or stipulation made requiring that the 
customer engage in load management exercises, or energy-saving activities. 
It is currently difficult to envisage how competition in a retail industry in South 
Africa would work. Perhaps, though, the retail industry, or even energy service 
companies, could become the natural home for DSM and particularly that which is 
targeted at the residential sector. Indeed DSM is about a service and not just a 
product. In this type of environment, it is most likely that DSM (in general) will 
take the form of a value-added service, with benefits paid for by individual 
customers. If this is the case, then, keeping other barriers to entry into the market in 
mind, it is unlikely that low-income households, in particular, will be able to 
11 In fact, there are indications that this is the case already. It is widely accepted that the 
'real' energy savings gains during peak hours come, not from the low-income 
household sector, but rather the middle-to-upper income sector. 
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participate to the extent to which they would perhaps like to. This might be another 
role for the regulator. 
6. Conclusion 
As is clear from the uncertainties presented in this paper, and in particular in the 
preceding section, it is difficult to predict the implications of reform in the 
electricity industry on DSM in general. One of the reasons for this is that different 
degrees and models of competition can be introduced. A very limited description 
has been given of some of the possible outcomes in South Africa. Clearly, other 
outcomes are also possible. 
By exploring some of the theoretical and historical aspects of the electricity 
industry and DSM and then focusing in on energy-efficient lighting to the low-
income sector, this paper has attempted to draw out some of the issues that will be 
requiring thought and debate in the next few years in South Africa. / 
It is unclear if DSM is worthwhile in competitive electricity industries. Three 
scenarios could, in this regard, be considered. First, DSM might be deemed 
worthwhile by the regulator, but not by the main players in the electricity industry. 
In the event of this, distributors and retailers will undertake DSM according to the 
regulations imposed on the industry. The Regulator might require that distributors 
or retailers dedicate a percentage of sales to DSM-related activity. Futhermore, 
distributors or retailers might be required to bid for amounts of electricity (either 
directly from Eskom, or from a common electricity pool if there is competition in 
generation) with mandatory DSM-related activity being an integral component of 
the bid. 
The second scenario is perhaps the more interesting: players in the industry might 
undertake DSM activities of their own accord; this is to say, engagment in DSM 
related activity is determined by the market. In this case, intersectoral linkages 
between generation, distribution, transmission and eventually, retail will develop. 
These linkages might be catalysed by the introduction, for example, of time-of-use 
tariffs. It will then be in the interests of distributors and retailers to undertake DSM 
activities in order for less expensive electricity to be purchased from the generation 
sector. The extent to which DSM-related activity is engaged in will also depend on 
whether or not the regulator allows DSM programme costs to be recovered in tariff 
structures. 
The third scenario, the most unlikely, is that neither the regulator nor the other 
players in the industry consider DSM worthwhile, in which case DSM programme 
activity will be discontinued. 
Finally, the paper has suggested that DSM activity targeted at the residential sector 
will most likely be driven by the EDI and, eventually, energy service companies or 
the retail sector. For low-income households it becomes even less clear what form 
DSM activity will take. For distributors and retailers in competition, the returns 
probably do not justify their engagement in this sector. It might be that the 
motivation for involvement be related more to the distributor or retailer's social 
responsibility towards this sector. 
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